|This Ph.D.-level course introduces students to a range of economic tools used to study models explicitly involving strategic behavior, information transmission, and contracting in economics and finance. The intention is to prepare the student to conduct research using these tools. Techniques studied include agency theory, signaling models, and sequential games of incomplete information. In addition, some applications of the tools will be covered. The approach is rigorous and analytical.
First class assignment: Purchase the required materials, read the syllabus (with special attention to the section on prerequisites), and read the article by Holmström mentioned below.
|Articles from the economics literature, e.g., "Moral Hazard and Observability," by Bengt Holmström (Bell Journal, spring 1979). All of these, except one, are available on JSTOR (links are included on the course syllabus - see my web site). The one exception will be available through online Regenstein Reserve. Microeconomic Theory, by A. Mas-Colell, M. D. Whinston, and J. Green (Oxford University Press, 1995) and Contract Theory, by P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont (MIT Press, 2005) may also be useful but are not mandatory.|
|Based on homework assignments and a final exam.|
|It is assumed that students have a good background in basic microeconomic theory (preferably Economics 30100, 30200). A facility with the use of multivariate calculus and elementary probability (as opposed to a dim memory of having had a course in these subjects at some time in the past) is required. See the syllabus on my web site for more detail.
Description and/or course criteria last updated: 06/12
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